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COURT INTEGRATION IN CONNECTICUT:
A CASE STUDY OF STEPS IN JUDICIAL REFORM
By CHARLES E. CLARK* and ELIAS CLARK"
OF late the impetus to procedural reform resulting from the interest cre-
ated by the adoption in 1938 of the new federal rules of procedure has
tended more and more to emphasize a re-examination of the basic court
structure. This is a natural and a desirable trend. While pleading is a
detail in judicial administration, a very important one in the light of our
legal history, it still remains a detail. Its simplification will improve the
administration of the particular court to which it applies; it will not unite
into a single coherent scheme of businesslike character all the innumerable
diverse, but overlapping and conflicting, tribunals so much a part of the
American scene. Since the situation is usually at its worst with the so-
called minor courts, the courts actually nearest the people, it is but natural
that reform groups should busy themselves increasingly with this funda-
mental problem. And there is now at hand a solution, carefully thought
through and widely supported by a rapidly increasing body of legal litera-
ture. It is the plan of the unified or integrated court, a single court of vary-
ing departments under competent administrative direction. In 1949 the
present writers had the opportunity, by virtue of a directive from a state
government reorganization commission, to point out how the Connecticut
lower courts exemplified the usual evils to a degree and to blueprint a plan
of integration carrying the views of the experts to their logical conclusion.
This article is therefore offered as an account of this venture and as, per-
haps, a case study of at least a sober beginning to court reform in a state in
real need of it.
I. THE MOVEMENT FOR COURT INTEGRATION
For an understanding of our present story, some note must be taken at
once of the background of the movement, both nationally and locally. The
first great impetus toward reform through integration came from the
sweeping changes instituted by the English Judicature Act of 1873, when
the vast historic accumulation of English courts was replaced by a single
integrated Supreme Court of Judicature.' The success of the British re-
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forms stimulated immediate interest in the United States. It was Dean
Roscoe Pound of Harvard who first gave expression to that interest some
forty or more years ago by pointing out the desirability of the integrated
court system as applied to the various courts in this country.' He pro-
posed a unified court, effective business management of the judicial estab-
lishment under an administrative chief justice armed with full rule-mak-
ing power for the entire system, and transfer of minor court functions from
fee-paid, lay justices of the peace to a system of district or county-wide
minor courts, each one large enough to afford a salaried law-trained judge.
Early support for his proposals came from the American Judicature So-
ciety, which drafted a Model Judicature Act in 1914,8 and later from the
National Municipal League, which drafted a Model State Constitution to
include an integrated judiciary.4 More recently the American Bar Associ-
ation's Section of Judicial Administration has advocated these reforms as
basic minima for the improvement of local court organization."
These administrative reforms were initially applied in the federal judici-
ary, at first by the interchange of judges between districts and circuits, and
then, in 1939, by the creation of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts.' This office performs the business functions of the federal
courts, maintains current statistics on the operation of all the courts, and
makes recommendations for changes in the allotment of judges as the pres-
sure of business requires. It has so effectively demonstrated its usefulness
that in 1948 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws drafted a Model Act to Provide for an Administrator for State
Courts7
In the states, integrated courts were first set up at the municipal level, in
several large cities, including Chicago and Cleveland.' District or county
court systems for minor courts have begun to appear in a few states ; and
2. Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction zwith the Administration of Justice
(an address given before the American Bar Association in 1906), 29 A.B.A. Rur. 395
(1906), 40 Am. L. REV. 729 (1906), 20 J. Am. JUD. Soc'v 178 (1937); POUND, ORCIANIZA-
TION Or COURTS 273-294 (1940).
3. Am. JUD. Soc'Y BULL. VII (1914).
4. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION Art. VI and Ex-
planatory Article at 35 (5th ed. 1948, originally published 1921).
5. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, A HANDBOOK PRE-
PARED BY THE SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A.B.A., 17-31 (1949).
6. 28 U.S.C. §§ 601-610 (1948), 53 STAT. 1223 (1939); Shafroth, Improvng Judicial
Administration in the State Courts, 8 Mo. L. REV. 5 (1943); Chandler, The Administration
of the Federal Courts, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 182 (1948).
7. HANDBK. OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON 'UNIFORM
STATE LAWs 167-169 (1948).
8. For a description of the development of these courts see POUND, ORGANIZATION OF
COURTS 263-269 (1940); VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINIS-
TRATION 51 (1949).
9. VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 306-316
(1949).
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in Massachusetts the district court system has been recently placed under
the comprehensive central authority of an administrative committee.10
The first state to achieve a completely integrated judiciary, from the Su-
preme Court down to the Municipal and District Courts, is New Jersey,
under its new 1947 constitution and subsequent statutes." A substantial
measure of at least unified direction has also been achieved in California,
District of Columbia, Maryland, and Missouri,' while in the first state,
California, a proposal for more concrete unification is being voted on this
fall.13  Proposals to integrate their respective judicial establishments are
now under consideration in such widely separated states as Minnesota,14
Arkansas, 5 Colorado,'" Texas, 7 Mississippi,' and Illinois,'0 with profes-
sional interest undoubtedly yet more widespread, although not yet the sub-
ject of available published comment. 0
10. M.ASS. GEN. LAWs c. 218, § 43A (1932), as amended L. 1941, c. 6S2, and L 1943, C.
101.
11. N. 3. CONST. ART. VI (1947); N. J. STAT. ANN. §§2:IA-l-2:16A-6 (1949);
Harrison, Judicial Reform in New Jersey, 22 STATE GovERNmENT 232 (1949); Harrison,
New Jersey's New Court System, 2 RUTGERS U. L. REv. 60 (1948) ; Hartshorne, Progress
in New Jersey Judicial Administration, 3 RUTGERS U. L. REv. 161 (1949); Convention
Committee Describes New Judicial System Adopted in New Jersey, 31 J. A. Jury. Soe'y
138 (1948); The Record of the Courts of New Jersey, 1948-1949, reprinted from N.J.LJ.,
Sept. 1, 1949.
12. VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 57-64.
13. State-Wide Minor Court Reorganiation Will Appear on November Ballot in
California, 34 J. Am. Jun. Soc's 58 (1950), stating that the plan for the reorganization of
the inferior courts to be voted upon is one on which the State Bar Association, the Judicial
Council, and other interested organizations have been working for ten years.
14. REPORT OF THE COmmiTTEE ON UNIFICATION OF THE COURTS TO THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF MINNESOTA (1943); Doherty, Plan for Reorganication of Judicial System of
Minnesota, 24 DICTA 72 (1947).
15. The Arkansas Court Plan, 30 J. Am. JuD. Soc's 15 (1946); Report of Court Re-
orgatization Commission, 2 ARx. L. REv. 174 (1948).
16. Henry, The Thirty-Seventh General Assembly, 26 DICTA 105 (1949); Johnson,
The Judiciary Committee Plan and the 1949 General Assembly, 25 DICTA 281 (1948); Van
Cise, A Report from the Judiciary Committee, 26 DICTA 139 (1949); Young, Integration
of State Judiciary Recommended, 23 J. Am. Jun. Soe', 233 (1940).
17. Sample, Proposed Amendment to the Judiciary Arlicle of the Texas Cotstitution,
25 TEx. L. REv. 492 (1947); Proposed Amendment to Article V of the State Constituton
Relating to the Judicial System of Texas, 9 TEx. B.J. 347 (1946) ; Texas Judicial Council
Publishes Court Organication Plan, 31 J. Am. Jun. Soc's 15 (1947).
18. ETHRIDGE, MODERNIZING MISSISSIPI's CONSTITUTION, Bureau of Public Ad-
ministration, Univ. of Mississippi, 1-116 (1950).
19. A newly created Section on Judicial Administration and Reorganization of the
Illinois State Bar Association, under the chairmanship of Floyd E. Thompson, former Chief
Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court, has been studying since June of this year the possi-
bilities of a complete reorganization of the Illinois court structure. Letter dated May 22,
1950, from Albert E. Jenner, Jr., President of the Illinois State Bar Association, to the
senior author of this article.
20. Thus exmnples of such interest may be cited from Virginia, REP. OF THE Juy.
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It is true that the number of states where integration and other reform
proposals have been advanced far exceeds the number where they have been
put completely into effect. The frankly political opposition, more success-
ful in the local arena than within the federal judiciary, presents a formid-
able obstacle. It can be considered fairly routed in a headlong conflict in
only a single state, New Jersey. There, although much remains to be done
for the complete knitting together of the lowest tribunals in order to avoid
unnecessary overlapping, yet both the power and the pattern have been
made available and the results to date in increased court effectiveness are
remarkable.2 This is an inspiring example of accomplishment for the
other states and justified us in hoping, as was reiterated on numerous oc-
casions, that what New Jersey had accomplished Connecticut could at least
attempt.
II. THE STUDY PROJECT AND ITS IMMEDIATE BACKGROUND
In Connecticut, as is pointed out more in detail later, the cotirt system
presents particular evils in a duplicating system of courts of substantially
general jurisdiction, an unusual number-for so small a state-of justice-
of-the-peace, town, city, and borough courts, and a unique probate setup of
COUNCIL FOR VIRGINIA 16, 17 (1949) (recommendation of a statute for an administrative
officer for the courts) ; Rhode Island, HULL, CHALLENGE TO THE LAW (1949) (reprint of a
series of articles on the law and the courts appearing in The Providence Journal-Bulletin
followed by discussion before the State Bar Association, participated in by the senior author
hereof); and Louisiana, where the Louisiana State Law Institute is working upon the re-
vision of the Civil Code, the Code of Practice, the General Statutes, and the Constitution of
Louisiana. Letter dated February 25, 1950, from J. Denson Smith, Director of the Insti-
tute, to the senior author. The aliveness of the topic is shown continuously in the current
issues of the Journal of the American Judicature Society.
21. A comparative analysis of the performance of the New Jersey courts from Sep-
tember 15, 1948, to June 30, 1949, with comparable periods of the old courts, gives con-
clusive proof of the success of the New Jersey reforms. In its first year of operation the
present appellate system (Supreme Court and Appellate Division of the Superior Court)
disposed of 60% more appeals in 73% less time as compared with their predecessor. Six
judges of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court heard an average of 152 cases as
against the average of 46 per judge in 1947-1948. Thirteen judges (one of whom was ab-
sent more than six months due to illness) of the Law Division of the Superior Court dis-
posed of 7,673 cases as against 3,878 in the same comparable period by thirteen judges of
the former courts of similar jurisdiction, an increase of 987 in cases disposed of by the
new court. The County Court judges disposed of 4,135 cases between September 15, 1948,
and June 30, 1949, compared with 2,332 by the old Courts of Common Pleas in a comparable
period-an increase of 77%. As to the over-all picture, approximately twice as much
business was transacted in a year by fewer judges, with substantial savings in expense and
time, than had ever been transacted in a comparable period by the former courts. Harrison,
Judicial Reformn in New Jersey, 22 STATE GOVERNMENT 232, 247, 248 (1949); WoELI!,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY 1948-1949, 1-15, with statistical tables 17-131. This excellent record is
being even bettered this year: WOELPER, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEWv JERSEY 1949-1950.
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the amazing total of 120 courts supported by fees and showing, seemingly,
at once the best-paid and the worst-paid judges of the country, if not of the
globe. Although this situation has brought forth deserved criticism, the
various attempts at reform described later proved abortive because of di-
vided counsels and lack of a unified desire for the complete overhauling of
structure to which these repeated calls for new reform committees or com-
missions and new or further studies seemed obviously to point. The writ-
ers feel that they had a real opportunity not available to these previous
bodies, since the terms of their commitment permitted them to cut loose
from all entangling alliances and compromises and to follow the logical
path to its conclusion. In the first instance they had only themselves and
the research associates of their study unit to convince; in the second in-
stance they had only the commission members, five distinguished business
and professional laymen to whom they reported, to persuade. On other
terms the task would not have been attractive and probably would not have
been undertaken, at least by us. Now the proposal is in the hands of the
public. Whatever the outcome, there is now at hand at least a model to pre-
sent an aim and an ideal.
The present project developed as a result of the creation, by legislative
act and gubernatorial appointment, of a Commission on State Government
Organization, charged with the duty to "study all the functions of the
state government." This commission has been likened in methods of
operation and aspirations to the Hoover Commission, of present national
fame. In many respects this comparison is apt; there are, however, some
significant differences. Perhaps the most important difference is in the
respective areas of governmental activity which were surveyed. The fed-
eral commission, like most of its state prototypes, was restricted to a study
of the executive branch, while this Commission interpreted the broad terms
of the legislative mandate to mean what it appeared to say, and hence or-
ganized a study of all three state departments--executive, legislative, and
judicial.
Pursuant to this broad authority, the Commission in July, 1949, set up
as one of its specialized survey groups Survey Unit No. 18 to examine and
make recommendations concerning the Connecticut judicial system, with
the senior author hereof as Project Director, the junior author as Associ-
ate Director, and a staff of legally trained research associates. The Survey
Unit concentrated its research on three main topics-the existing Connecti-
cut system, previous recommendations for reform in this state, and experi-
ence in other states and the teachings of the experts. The results of this
research led to several conclusions: first, that there was a genuine need for
reform of the Connecticut court organizations; second, that this need had
not been lessened by the temporary panaceas which had been tried as a
22. § 3, Corn. Special Act 28, 1949.
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result of the previous attempts at reform; and third, that the solution to
the problem of reform, in its scientific and scholarly aspects, had already
been worked out to the satisfaction of students and jurists in what has come
to be known as the system of an integrated court for the entire state. These
conclusions, plus a comprehensive plan for the reorganization of the Con-
necticut courts, were transmitted to the Commission in December, 1949."
That body, after some months of independent deliberation upon this and
the other reports before it, adopted and published its report in February,
1950, accepting the broad outlines of the Survey Unit's proposal as Chap-
ter Nine, "Strengthening the Courts," of its Report to the Governor and
General Assembly. -4 The Commission did not ask for immediate execu-
tion of the court proposals, but rather sought general approval and the cre-
ation of a new commission to work out the details over a longer period of
time. The special session of the legislature called by the Governor to con-
sider the Report took little action of any kind"' and none at all with refer-
ence to these proposals. They are, however, the subject of study by bar as-
sociation groups at the present time. As we point out below, it seems clear
that the proposals are not dead, but are probably progressing as far and as
rapidly as their complete nature and the prevailing conservative atmosphere
of the state would make likely.
We shall turn, therefore, to the conclusions set forth in the Report20
as to the special features of the problem in Connecticut, the previous impo-
tent attempts at cure, and the specific reorganization here projected for
the courts of the state.
III. THE PROBLEM IN CONNECTICUT
Recent high priests of judicial reform have stated their case in this way:
"In our form of government no institution is more fundamental than the
courts. Unless our courts can be kept strong and high in public esteem,
individual liberty cannot long endure. For this reason, then, the improve-
ment of judicial procedure is not an unimportant side issue, but is vital to
the defense of democracy. ' 27  Nevertheless it must be conceded that at
23. FINAL REPORT (Mimeographed), SURVEY UNIT #18 OF COMMISSION ON STATE
GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION (1949), accompanied by two supporting studies, not printed,
of which Part I was entitled "The Existing Connecticut Judicial System," and Part II
"Experience in Other States and the Teachings of the Experts."
24. REPORT OF COMMISSION ON STATE GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION 61 (1950).
25. See the account in Dean Fordham's informative review of the Report, p, 1541
infra. The Democratic State Central Committee has issued its own statement entitled Tim
SET-BACK FOR GOOD GOVERNMENT IN CONNECTICUT (1950), signed by Governor Bowles,
Senate Majority Leader Wechsler, and House Minority Leader Cotter.
26. Although not printed, the REPORT proper is available in mimeographed form, as
stated in note 23 supra.
27. THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, A HANDBOOK PRE-
PARED BY THE SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A.B.A., 3 (1949).
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this crucial moment in world history our courts are at some considerable
distance from this ideal. Judicial processes are criticized as inefficient,
slow, unnecessarily complex and costly, both to the litigants and to the
governmental units which support them. The Connecticut courts cannot
avoid these general charges, plus some special difficulties flowing from their
unusual organizational defects.
Two specific criticisms can be directed at the Connecticut judicial sys-
tem. First, it is not a system at all in the sense that system connotes "or-
derly organization." Second, there are deficiencies in the organization,
make-up, and jurisdiction of several of the groups of courts which are in-
cluded in the system. The reference in this later criticism is to the anoma-
lous position of the Court of Common Pleas in the hierarchy of courts and
the unprofessional administration of justice in the minor and probate
courts.
Lack of Organization of tMe Courts
It would be a simple matter to draw an organizational chart of the Con-
necticut judiciary. The chart would contain eight separate boxes, each
bearing the label of one court or group of courts. There would not be the
spider web of crisscrossing lines which represent the co-ordinating lines
of authority on the typical organizational chart. For all practical pur-
poses the eight sets of courts are wholly independent of each other.
This is, of course, an oversimplification. The pattern is not one of com-
plete disorganization. For instance, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Errors exercises some very limited controls over the entire judi-
ciary both through the prestige of his position and through statutory pow-
ers to assign judges in the higher courts.2 ' It has, however, been the tradi-
tion that the Chief Justice should use these powers very sparingly on his
own initiative. Then, too, in 1937 Connecticut took an important initial
28. See CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7678, 7679, 7681, 7624, 7600, 7653, 7609 (1949). Actually
this situation compares rather favorably with the general disorganized status of American
courts. In fifteen states other than Connecticut (Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia) power in the highest appellate court to assign judges
within some, but not all, of the inferior courts is the only type of central control that exists
within the respective systems. The lack of organization in the state courts of this country
is illustrated by the fact that even this limited control represents more central authority
than is found in the judicial departments of eleven states (Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Delaware; Georgia, Indiana, Mississippi, Nevada, Vermont, Wisconsin, and Wyoming)
where there are substantially no elements of external control, and of seventeen states
(Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire New
Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Ten-
nessee; Utah, and Washington) where there are almost no elements of effective control.
In only five jurisdictions (California, District of Columbia, Maryland, Missouri, and New
Jersey) is there a substantial degree of control exercised over all or almost all the courts.
VANDERBILT, op. cit. supra note 8, at 29-464.
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step toward the centralization of the business administration of the five
state-maintained courts in one office. A secretary of the Judicial Depart-
ment was appointed with limited authority to audit all bills, maintain cur-
rent accounting records, prepare budgets, act as purchasing agent, and
serve as pay roll officer.2"
Except for these particulars the chart is an accurate representation of the
Connecticut judiciary. The judicial department consists of eight courts or
groups of courts; five of these, the Supreme Court of Errors, the Superior
Court, the Court of Common Pleas, the Juvenile Court, and the Traffic
Court of Danbury, are maintained by the state; the other three, the minor
courts, the trial justice courts, and the probate courts, are supported by the
towns, cities, boroughs, or districts in which they are located. Each of
those courts operates as a separate and independent establishment.
This lack of organization means less efficient, slower, and more costly
administration of justice. A more detailed analysis would include the fol-
lowing basic criticisms: First, without a central co-ordinating authority
which collects and compiles statistics on the operations of the various courts
it is impossible to maintain uniformly high standards of judicial personnel
and production throughout the judiciary. Second, without integration of
the-court system it is impossible to equalize the workloads of the various
judges and to relieve congestion by assigning judges among the various
courts as the pressure of business requires. Third, unless the business ad-
ministration of the courts is centered in one office, there is a needless dupli-
cation of effort with a resulting loss of money in the handling of such mat-
ters as purchasing, pay rolls, personnel, budgeting, and accounting. And
fourth, without a unified court it is impossible to maintain uniform stand-
ards, rules, and procedures for all the courts. These are the general argu-
ments for the system; they have special pertinence here in view of the
political complexion of and job-scramble in the minor courts and the de-
moralizing effect of the fee system in the probate courts.
An indication of the benefits which might result from a more highly or-
ganized system is demonstrated by the degree of success which the office of
the Executive Secretary has already had in bringing greater efficiency to
the business administration of the state courts. This is only a beginning,
The logical next step is further expansion in the same direction.
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7661 (1949). This office has been filled with extreme capa-
bility by Mr. Edward C. Fisher of Hartford since its creation in 1937. Similar offices have
been created in Missouri, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New Jersey. Recommenda-
tions for such an office have been made in Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Mississippi, New
York, Texas, and Virginia. REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON MODEL AcT TO
PROVIDE FOR AN ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE STATE COURTS, HANDBOOK OF TIIE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 161-168 (1947);
THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, A HANDBOOK PREPARED By
THE SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, A.B.A., 22-29 (1949).
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The Court of Common Pleas
There is no question as to the Supreme Court of Errors and the Superior
Court except perhaps as to means further to conserve and fortify their ac-
complishments by complete rule-making authority and the full administra-
tive directive in the office of the Chief Justice. The Court of Common
Pleas, the next in the hierarchy of courts, does, however, present problems
which need clarification. It is now in the anomalous position of being both
a "replica of the Superior Court" and an "inferior court" in the constitu-
tional sense.3°
When originally constituted in 1869, 1870, these courts were estab-
lished as county, not state, courts in four counties only. Their subsequent
listory has been one of steady encroachment on the jurisdiction of the Su-
perior Court. This development was not uniform throughout the state,
but rather varied from county to county. By 1941 it had become apparent
that the process of independent growth of these courts by counties could not
continue unabated without disrupting the entire system and that a redefini-
tion of the status of these courts within the judicial organization was re-
quired. The legislature was confronted with two choices: either the sev-
eral Courts of Common Pleas could be relegated to the status of minor
courts or they could be modeled along the lines of an inferior Superior
Court. It is questionable whether these alternatives presented a real choice.
The Courts of Common Pleas were already operating as junior Superior
Courts, and it is axiomatic that a legislature can expand authority more
easily than it can curtail it. Furthermore, the hope was voiced that an
expanded Court of Common Pleas would serve to relieve the pressure of
business then existing in the Superior Court."1 In any event, the legisla-
ture chose to organize the Court of Common Pleas in the image of the Su-
perior Court.
Under the reorganization act of 1941, the court was established as a
state court, with the judges, originally fourteen in number, now reduced
by statutory direction to ten, doing circuit duty as do the Superior Court
judges.32 The jurisdiction of the court is in some important matters ex-
clusive, in others concurrent with the Superior Court on the one hand and
with the minor courts on the other. Thus according to the statute it has
exclusive jurisdiction of "equitable" actions to $2,500 in amount and, ex-
cept for the jurisdiction it shares with municipal courts, in "legal" actions
from $100 to $2,5003 and of all appeals from municipal boards and com-
30. Walkinshaw v. O'Brien, 130 Conn. 122, 32 A.2d 547 (1943).
31. The system of creating new courts of concurrent jurisdiction to relieve congested
dockets in existing courts is not a new one. For the experience in Illinois, Maryland, and
Virginia see POUND, ORGANIZATION OF CouRTs 243 (1940).
32. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7595 (1949).
33. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7740 (1949), "subject, however, to the provisions of section
7579," note 37 infra.
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missions and the state liquor control commission ;84 and it hears civil ap-
peals de novo from municipal courts and trial justices in cities or towns of
less than 15,000 population.85 It has concurrent jurisdiction with the Su-
perior Court in all actions from $2,500 to $5,000 and for the foreclosure of
mortgages and liens regardless of the extent to which the demand exceeds
these amounts ;3 and it has concurrent jurisdiction with municipal courts
in legal actions from $100 to $1,000.87 On the criminal side in five coun-
ties it considers de novo appeals from municipal courts and trial justices
and cases of nonsupport in which the accused has been bound over from
a lower tribunal.8
It will be seen that these lines of demarcation are quite illogical. Roughly
speaking, the importance of the cause or charge is the basis of the test. At
best it is difficult to evaluate a case by such variable standards as the values
which may be claimed by the parties or the charges made by the prosecutor.
The problem is made doubly difficult when the issue turns upon technical
legal distinctions, now largely outworn, of "equity" or "law" or the like.
Question was immediately raised as to whether or not the legislature
could constitutionally elevate an inferior court to a status where it was but
a "replica of the Superior Court." In 1943, the Supreme Court by a di-
vided vote held, "not without considerable hesitance," that the statute did
not exceed the limits of constitutionality. There was, however, an implicit
warning in the majority opinion that any further encroachments on the
jurisdiction of the Superior Court would not be looked upon with favor.'
Today the Court of Common Pleas has reached another turning point
in its development. First, the experience of the past few years has demon-
strated that there is no need for a circuit Court of Common Pleas in the
rural counties.40 Second, the pressure of business in the populous counties
has increased to such an extent that the courts will have to be expanded,
both as to facilities and personnel, in order to keep pace with the demands
upon them.41 And third, the expanded Court of Common Pleas has failed
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7742 (1949).
35. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7584 (1949).
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7741 (1949).
37. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7740 (1949), together with § 7579, conferring jurisdiction up
to $1,000 in places of 15,000 or more population, otherwise $500, and including land actions
for legal or equitable relief within the same limits.
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8742 (1949), as amended by § 696a (Supp. 1949).
39. Walkinshaw v. O'Brien, 130 Conn. 122, 32 A.2d 547 (1943).
40. During the period September, 1947, to June, 1948, the court sat for civil cases,
excluding short or motion calendar, 6 days in Windham, 18 in Tolland, 31 in Middlesex,
44 in Litchfield, 74 in New London, and 84 in Waterbury as opposed to 276 days in Fair-
field, 248 in Hartford, and 196 in New Haven. ELEVENTH REP. CONN. JUD. COUNcIL 25
(1948).
41. At the conclusion of the court year 1941-42, the first year of the reorganization of
the Court of Common Pleas, there were 2,004 civil cases undisposed of in Fairfield, 1,965
in New Haven, and 1,622 in Hartford; at the conclusion of the court year 1948-49 there
[Vol. 59: 13951404
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to diminish the pressure of business in the Superior Court.4 2 Thus it
would seem that the time has come for a reclarification of the role which
the Court of Common Pleas is to play in the judicial system. Once again
there are two alternatives: The court can be reduced to the status of a
minor court or it can be expanded anew at the expense of the Superior
Court. It is suggested that wise policy favors the former course. There
is no justification for maintaining two circuit courts distinguished only by
illogical and arbitrary lines of jurisdiction. An expanded Court of Com-
mon Pleas has shown no ability to reduce the congestion in the Superior
Court, and any further encroachment on the Superior Court's jurisdiction
may very well be found constitutionally defective. Consequently, reform
at this time should move toward the utilization of the structure of the Court
of Common Pleas as a foundation for an improved minor court system,
leaving the Superior Court, with the absorption of the present common
pleas business, as the sole circuit court of general jurisdiction.
The Lower Courts
The most direct contact of the ordinary citizen with the judiciary is
through the operation of the minor and trial justice courts. These are the
peoples' courts where the troubles and the faults which involve the every-
day matters of daily life are adjudicated. From the human standpoint, at
least, they are the most important courts. Yet it is true in Connecticut as
elsewhere that these courts are the orphans of the judicial system. A prime
concern of modern judicial reform is to give them a capability and a pres-
tige commensurate with their intrinsic importance.
It is safe to say that there has never been any real satisfaction in the or-
ganization or operation of the town, city, and borough courts established by
special acts or city charters in 66 of the 169 towns or cities of the state' 3
Throughout the nineteenth century, as the character of the state changed
from a predominantly rural community to a community of towns and cities,
it became increasingly clear that the justice-of-the-peace system was wholly
inadequate to handle the multitude of cases arising in the urban centers.
As a result, a variety of town, city, borough, and police courts, organized
and maintained by the local municipalities, mushroomed throughout the
state to supplement or supersede the justices of the peace in the adminis-
were 2,952 civil cases undisposed of in Fairfield, 3,483 in New Haven, and 2,953 in Hart-
ford. In 1941-42 there were fourteen judges; as of March, 1950, there are ten judges.
Statistics obtained from the office of the Executive Secretary of the Judicial Department.
42. At the conclusion of the court year 1940-41, the year before the reorganization of
the Court of Common Pleas, there were 9,578 civil cases undisposed of in the Superior
Court; at the conclusion of the court year 1947-48 there were 12,695 civil cases undisposed
of. ELEvENT REP. CONr. JUD. COUNCIL 19 (1948).
43. For a listing of these courts see CONNECTICUT STATE REGISTER AND M ANMAL
215-221 (1949).
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tration of minor causes. There was no plan or pattern for this develop-
ment. As the need for a court arose, one was established. A necessary
result of this haphazard development was the utmost variation in practice,
procedure, and jurisdiction.44 For years there was a persistent clamor
from the lawyers who had to practice in this confusion for legislation which
would bring some uniformity to the system. 4
In 1939 the legislature made an attempt at solution through the stand-
ardization of the jurisdictional limits of these courts. A distinction was
made according to population. Thus a court in a town, city, borough, or
district having a population of 15,000 or more has jurisdiction of legal
and equitable actions where the matter in demand does not exceed $1,000,
while in communities of less than 15,000 the limit is $500. Comparable
distinctions based on the punishment which can be given appear in the
criminal jurisdiction of these courts.40  At best the 1939 legislation can be
described as only a first step. These courts are still independent of each
other, responsible only to the municipality which maintains them. It is
obvious that no single statute can bring a common practice or common
standards for the administration of justice to these courts.
Even more universal has been the criticism of these courts for the method
by which their judges are selected. Until 1949, the judges were chosen for
two-year terms by the General Assembly.4" Now by constitutional amend-
ment they are appointed, on terms to be set by statute, by the General As-
sembly ol nomination of the Governor. 8
As is well known, a chief impetus for the change in method of selection
of these judges came from public disgust with the scramble for these ap-
pointments at each session of the legislature. Because of the extremely po-
litical nature of the offices a complete turnover of the entire personnel of a
local court each two years was an accepted thing. Under such conditions
a trained and experienced personnel was impossible. A position as prose-
cutor, clerk, or judge would be sought or accepted by a lawyer as a tempo-
44. For some of the problems caused by this haphazard and illogical development of
minor courts see POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 263-269 (1940); POUND, CRIMINAL
JUSTIcE IN A.mcA 174-196 (1930) ; Kross and Grossman, Magistrates' Courts of the City
of New York; Suggested Improvements, 7 BROOKLYN L. REv. 411 (1938); SIITH, JUS-
TICE AND THE POOR 42, 43 (1924). Even though the New York situation seems particu-
larly chaotic, attempts at reform in the last session of the legislature failed. SIXTI.ENTII
REP. N. Y. JUD. COUNCIL 58-66 (1950); Statement of Robert P. Patterson, President of
the Assoc. of the Bar of the City of New York, 5 THE RECORD 2-4 (1950) ; Denonn, Mini-
mhum Standards of Judicial Administration, 5 THE RECORD 137 (1950); N.Y. Times,
March 22, 1950, p. 7.
45. See Brown & Doherty, Connecticut Courts of Limited Jurisdiction. A Survey,
14 CONN. B.J. 230 (1940).
46. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 7579, 8733 (1949).
47. CONN. CONST. ART. 5, § 3; CONN. CONST. AMEND. XX; CONN. GEN. STAT. § 72
(1949).
48. CONN. CONsT. AMEND. XLVII (1948).
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rary matter to build prestige and aid a budding law practice. In fact, many
of the positions were held by laymen. There was a proper fear of the mis-
use of the criminal processes to support the private civil business of the
court officer; there was also the aroma of adjustment of traffic and other
minor violations through the political forces ultimately responsible for the
judicial appointments.49 As a result of these abuses the Judicial Council
and others for years advocated a change in the method of selection to that
successfully followed in the high courts, and the constitutional amendment
became effective with the favorable vote upon it at the 1948 election.
As yet the reform has not been able to prove itself. The political division
in the two houses of the legislature and the disagreement of the House with
the Governor resulted in the failure of the 1949 Assembly to enact any
enabling legislation as the amendment contemplated. The Governor there-
fore named his choices after the legislature adjourned, the sitting judges
claimed the right to hold over, and litigation was necessary, resulting in a
victory for the Governor's appointees under the construction of the law
made by the Supreme Court.50 This dispute obviously did not add to the
prestige of these courts, although it is hardly a fair test of what the system
may accomplish when properly implemented. But the handicaps of both
an unfortunate past and a dissipation of jurisdiction among so many and
so diverse tribunals are sure to dog these courts in the future so that even
the establishment of a substantial term of office to carry out the system of
selection will probably prevent an accomplishment at all comparable with
that of the high courts. Only a complete break with the past will assure
courts of a dignity, prestige, and high professional standing commensurate
with the importance of the matters before them.
Prior to 1939 all petty causes, civil and criminal, arising in localities
where there was no town, city, or borough court were handled by local jus-
tices of the peace. Today the jurisdiction of these justices is restricted to
civil actions in which the matter in demand does not exceed $100.1 Stat-
utes provide that justices of the peace be elected biennially for each town by
a plurality of the voters of that town ;12 and each town is required to elect
justices to a number equal to one-third the number of jurors to which that
town is entitled. 3 Inasmuch as the average jury list includes a very sub-
stantial number from each town, justices of the peace are elected in large
49. This condition has been vividly set forth in FOURT REP. CONN. JUD. COUNCIL
5-8 (1934). See also Brown & Doherty, Connecticut Courts of Linited Jurisdiction. A
Survey, 14 CoNN. B.J. 230, 231 (1940); Maltbie, The Appointment of Judges of Town,
City, Borough and Police Courts, 17 N.H. COUNTY B.A. BULr. 40-48 (1934); Maltbie,
Appointment of Municipal Court Judges, 17 CoNN. B.J. 29-33 (1943).
50. State ex rel. Rundbaken v. Watrous, 135 Conn. 638, 63 A.2d 289 (1949) ; Braden,
The Case of the Late Afternoon Judges, 23 CONN. B.J. 217 (1949).
51. CONN. GFN. STAT. § 7739 (1949).
52. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7545 (1949).
53. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7546 (1949).
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numbers, ranging from five to sixty per town and totalling into the thou-
sands for the entire state. 4 In none of the towns is there sufficient business
to keep so many judicial officers occupied. As a practical solution to this
problem the custom developed whereby many of the elected justices re-
frained from taking the oath of office, leaving what business there was to
those justices who do qualify. This custom, however, did not face or
solve the underlying problem. Potentially, each elected justice is, at his
own option, a separate and independent court. It is obvious that the very
number of these courts precludes the possibility of maintaining a high
standard of justice.
The faults of the justice-of-the-peace system are legion." The vast ma-
jority of the justices are not lawyers; they are elected in such large numbers
that a voter cannot properly adjudge their qualifications. Not surprisingly,
therefore, they differ greatly in judicial ability. The justices hold sessions
at irregular times and places. Their actions are not publicized; nor are the
justices responsible, save for the formal appeal allowed the parties in a
particular case, to any higher authority or directing control. They make
no reports, and the court records remain permanently in their personal pos-
session. In civil litigation the justices are still paid by fees assessed against
the parties. Customarily, a merchant directs his frequent small claims to
the justice who is "accustomed to handle them." As the 1944 Report of
the Commission To Study the Integration of the State Judicial System
pointed out, it would be strange "if a justice who received a regular flow
of fees from a given source could regard each of these actions with cold
and indifferent scrutiny. ' ' 6
In 1939 the legislature, following the recommendations of the "Commit-
tee to Study the Minor Court System," passed a statute which provided
that in communities where there was no municipal court criminal jurisdic-
tion be conferred exclusively on a single "trial justice" or, in the event that
he was unable to act, an "alternate trial justice"; that these two offices be
filled by the selectmen of each town from the elected justices of the peace;
that the trial justice appoint a "prosecuting grand juror" and an "alternate
prosecuting grand juror" whose duty it would be to make investigations
and bring complaints; and that all of these officials be paid a salary by the
54. For a listing of these officers see CONNECTICUT STATE REGISTER AND MANUAL
273-416 (1949).
55. The justice of the peace is the most common judicial officer in America, but also
the most criticized. For a sampling of the literature on the evils of the justice-of-the-peace
system see SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1924); Howard, The J.usticc of the Peace
System it; Tennessee, 13 TENN. L. REv. 19 (1934) ; Smith, The Justice of the Peace System
in the United States, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 118 (1926); What About the People's Courts?
17 J. Am. JU. Soc'y 100 (1933); Lummus, Justice in Minor Courts Appraised by Expert,
22 J. Am. JUD. Soc'Y 38 (1938).
56. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION To STUDY THE INTEGRATION OF THE STATE JU-
DICIAL SYSTEM 14 (1944).
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selectmen. 1 This statute was aimed at concentrating all the criminal juris-
diction in one, presumably more qualified, officer and abolishing the evils
of the fee system. Pursuant to this statute there are now 102 trial justice
courts operating in the 103 towns not served by a municipal court 8
The 1939 partial reform was important in that it made the outworn jus-
tice-of-the-peace system at least partially workable. This may perhaps be
considered a major fault, for it tended to postpone the day when thorough-
going reform would be demanded. No revamping of a fundamentally de-
fective system by refining only details can work a substantial and lasting
improvement. Left still in operation is a veritable multitude of courts, each
differing from the others in practice, standards, and competence of person-
nel. Most of the evils of the justice-of-the-peace system have thus survived
this reorganization. Genuine reform can come only from a complete break
with the past and the creation of a new minor court structure, state-wide in
operation, supported by the state, and directed by the experienced adminis-
trators of the unified state judicial system.
The Probate Courts
The probate courts present the most difficult problem of all-they are
the courts which most need reform,"0 but are the most firmly entrenched
politically.
Originally the probate courts were organized on a county-wide basis;
but beginning in 1719 came the establishment of probate districts of less
than a county in area." This process has continued apace until now there
are 120 districts, many only coextensive with the towns where they are
situated. Almost every session of the legislature brings forth new bills for
the division of the larger and richer districts. Thus two new districts
were authorized by legislation in 1947." This modern proliferation of dis-
tricts is particularly remarkable in that it has occurred in defiance of re-
57. Coxr. GEN. STAT. § 7566 (Appointment of trial justices), § 756S (Jurisdiction of
trial justices), and § 7569 (Appointment of prosecuting grand jurors) (1949).
58. For a listing of these courts see CoNNEcTicuT STATE REGISTER AND u.MA.
222-225 (1949). No court is listed for the Town of Wolcott.
59. This opinion is shared by several of the leading experts in the field of probate court
organization. In a letter to the Survey Unit dated November 15, 1949, Professor Thomas
E. Atkinson of New York University wrote: "Under its present system Connecticut is just
about at the bottom of the list so far as its probate court system is concerned. This is not
to say that in some or perhaps many of your probate courts the actual administration of
-estates may not be satisfactory or even excellent. However, the county-superior court plan
would, in my opinion, clean up the bad spots and increase efficiency in the handling of
probate business throughout the state." See also Simes & Basye, The Organization of the
Probate Court in America, 42 MicH. L. REv. 965, 43 id. 113 (1944).
60. For a history of the development of the Connecticut probate courts see CLEAvz-
LAND, HEWITT & CLARKx, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE oF CO urcTicuT (1915) and
App. II, History of Connecticut Probate Jurisdiction, 917-923.
61. Coxe. GEN. STAT. § 1284i (Deep River), § 1285i (Colebrook) (Supp. 1947).
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peated warnings by observers of the system that the number of districts
was already too excessive to be manageable.
. Districting by towns bears no relation to population or wealth. As a
consequence there is extreme variation in the judicial burden among the
120 courts; the judges in the large municipalities are hard pressed to keep
abreast of the pressure of business; contrariwise, the judges in the small
towns are only infrequently called upon to open their courts. Despite the
efforts of the Connecticut Probate Assembly to establish uniformity, it is
obvious that in a system where each judge is a court unto himself no
amount of reform can standardize practice and procedure. These varia-
tions in procedure place a particularly onerous burden on parties to the
administration of a large estate which involves property situated in several
districts. 2
Since colonial times Connecticut has followed the early English view that
probate courts are traditionally of an inferior status to other courts." This
attitude, plus the fact that much of the probate work is administrative and
not judicial, accounts in large measure for the distinction, both in terms of
qualifications for office and informality of proceedings, made between the
probate courts and the other courts. Probate judges are elected and now
serve for four years.64 There is no requirement that they be lawyers; and,
in fact, about two-thirds of them are laymen. 5 True, the absence of legal
training is not a mark of incompetence. Nevertheless, it is obvious that a
layman, no matter how conscientious, cannot be expected to comprehend
fully the many technical legal aspects of estates law upon which the disposi-
tion of many thousands of dollars may depend.
It has been said that the probate courts are "peoples' courts." In keep-
ing with this characterization the proceedings of these courts are informal
to a degree, often being conducted in the judge's front parlor. Most es-
tates are administered without the aid of counsel. Defenders of the system
urge that in the great majority of cases the probating public depend upon
the court or its staff for legal advice. But this surely presents a problem
in judicial impartiality. A judge can hardly determine objectively issues
emanating from papers and accounts which he himself has prepared.
The same informality is applied to record keeping. Each judge is
62. Smith, Some Comments on the District Probate System, 7 CONN. B.J. 56 (1933).
63. Simes and Basye state that in about two-thirds of the states the probate court is a
separate court, but relegated to an inferior position in the judicial systems of those states.
Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America, 42 Msic. L. Ruv. 965,
995 (1944).
64. CONN. CoNs'r. AMEND. IX (1850), AMEND. XXI (1876), AMEND. XLIV (1948).
65. For a listing of the probate judges see CONNECTICUT REGISTER AND MANUAL
226-237 (1949). In the majority of states there is no requirement that the probate judges
be lawyers. Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate Court in America, 43
MicH. L. Rxv. 113, 138-140 (1944).
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charged with the responsibility for the records of his court."0 Oftentimes
these important records, which are muniments of title to real estate and
define many important attributes of personal status, are carelessly or im-
properly kept." This vital defect may be accentuated when a judge dies
and his successor tries to uncover the records so as to initiate an orderly
judicial administration.
Against this background it is not surprising to find that a probate decree
is not accorded conclusive effect." Appeals lie to the Superior Court,
where the entire issue may be tried de novo." There is no provision, and
there could hardly be, considering the caliber of the courts, for definitive
trial by jury, as in the New York Surrogate's Court." It has long been
the law that, while Connecticut must give full faith and credit to the probate
decrees of another state, such as New York, the other states need not give
a like effect to the judgments of these limited courts of our own state.7'
A recent statute assumes to say that a probate decree shall not be thus sub-
ject to collateral attack;7 whether dignity can thus be acquired by mere
statutory fiat, without added powers to the court itself, has not yet been
tested.
We refer again to the reliance made by protagonists of the present system
upon the informality of these courts as their greatest virtue, because the
question this raises is so fundamental. Thus it is said that the people want
a neighborly, over-the-back-fence type of justice, administered by judges
who are friendly and readily approachable. Does this mean that success in
adversary proceedings turns on which party is closest to the judge? The
Supreme Court of the United States in a famous case paid its respects to a
fee-supported system of criminal justice. 3 Without going so far as did
66. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6820 et seq. (1949).
67. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6822 (1949) requires each probate judge to keep the records
in a fireproof safe, vault, or building. Even if widely observed, this requirement may insure
protection of the records from fire, but does not affect their contents or how they are ju-
dicially filed.
68. Probate proceedings in Connecticut, Florida, Maine, Maryland, Vermont, and Wis-
consin are not entitled to the usual presumptions of regularity and validity accorded to
courts of general jurisdiction. Simes & Basye, The Organikaton of the Probate Court in
America, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 965, 990, 991 (1944). Compare, in general, Hopkins, The Ex-
traterritorial Effect of Probate Decrees, 53 YALE L.J. 221 (1944).
69. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7071 (1949); Slattery v. Woodin, 90 Conn. 48, 96 AtI. 178
(1915) ; Dunham v. Dunham, 97 Conn. 440, 117 At. 504 (1922). Twenty-six states permit
a trial de novo in the court of general jurisdiction on appeal from a decree of the probate
court. Simes & Bayse, supra note 63, at 995, 996.
70. N.Y. Sua.R CT. ACT §§ 68-70 (1950).
71. See Palmer v. Palmer, 31 F. Supp. 861, 866 (D.Conn. 1940); Plant v. Harrison, 36
Misc. 649, 74 N.Y. Supp. 411 (1902) ; In Willetts' Appeal, 50 Conn. 330 (1832) ; CLErA -
LAND, HEWITT & CLARK, PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE OF CONNECTICUT 131, 132 (1915).
72. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6817 (1949).
73. In Tumey v. State of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927), the Court in a unanimous decision
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the Court, it is reiterated that the friendly, helpful attitude to humble suitors
is more properly the function of the clerks and registrars serving in the
court than the judge who must ultimately pass on the legal merits of the
issues presented. 4
The Connecticut probate organization is most notorious for the fee sys-
tem by which its courts are supported." This system, a hang-over from
colonial days, has been repudiated as completely outworn by all but a hand-
ful of courts in this country." Formerly it was impossible to calculate with
any degree of accuracy the gross receipts of an individual court. In 1941
a statute was passed requiring each probate judge to file with the Secretary
of State an annual statement showing the gross receipts and itemized costs
of his office.Y Each year the people of the state are shocked anew by the
published statistics. The figures for 194818 indicate that the total gross
income of all the probate courts was $812,881.17. Of this total, $361,-
818.22 was spent on operating expenses, and the balance of $451,062.95
was retained by the 119 judges as compensation. Gross receipts varied
from highs of $99,757.03 in Hartford, $76,033.19 in New Haven, and
$64,900.82 in Bridgeport to lows of $133.85 in Cornwall, $135.90 in Kill-
ingworth, and $112.65 in Marlborough.
Each court is a separate business establishment unto itself-a fact which
serves to underline the nondescript character of these courts. A judge
must be his own purchasing agent; in the districts of any size he must
employ a staff whose tenure and salaries are set at his pleasure. But all
of his expenses must be met out of the receipts from fees. There are sur-
delivered by Mr. Chief Justice Taft held conviction of a defendant by a tribunal supported
by fees and costs from the conviction to be violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
74. As in the neighboring state of Massachusetts. The example of Massachusetts Is
cited not only because of the uniformly high standing of these state probate courts of
county-wide jurisdiction, see Simes & Basye, supra note 59; Atkinson, The Developmient
of the Massachusetts Probate System, 42 Micn. L. REv. 425 (1943), but because there has
seemed to be a disposition to put our probate courts above those of our neighbor. The
writers have not been able to ascertain a concrete basis for those opinions and believe they
must have developed without either theoretical study or practical acquaintance with these
courts, both of which would show that only a few of the best of our probate courts could
at all compete with the Massachusetts courts in accomplishment, and then only with the
very heavy schedule of fees, comparatively speaking, upon which the local courts rely. The
senior author hereof has served since 1924 in 'various capacities as guardian, executor, and
trustee under Massachusetts appointment or qualification and can testify from personal
experience as to the worth of these neighboring courts.
75. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3636 (1949), as amended by § 406a (Supp. 1949).
76. The fee system has been preserved, in whole or in part, in the probate courts of
Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, North Carolina, Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Texas. Simes & Basye, The Organization of the Probate
Court in America, 43 Mica. L. Rnv. 113, 143-145 (1944).
77 CONN. GEN. STAr. § 6834 (1949).
78. These are the latest figures available at the time of the preparation of the report.
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prising variations in the amounts attributed to expenses. For instance, in
Hartford expenses are listed at $81,010.23, while in New Haven they are
$49,936.80 and in Bridgeport $30,138.43. 79 Inasmuch as each judge is
his own auditor, it is impossible to determine how comparable these figures
are.
The balance remaining after the deduction of expenses goes to the judge
as compensation. Here again there are tremendous variations in amounts.
In Bridgeport the net income is reported at $34,762.59, in New Haven
$26,096.39, in Greenwich $23,081.42, in Stamford $20,686.76, and in
Hartford $18,746.80, while in Cornwall it is but $105.51, in Killingworth
$65.23, in Hampton $61.00, and in Lyme 0.00.0 Such was the public
reaction to these statistics that the legislature in 1947 passed a statute aimed
at the recapture of approximately $30,000 of these fees. 8 ' But $30,000
out of total net receipts of $451,062.95 could hardly be called coming to
grips with the basic evils of the fee system. The fact that these courts,
whose decrees are not considered worthy of full faith and credit, are
manned by judges some of whom are among the highest paid judicial offi-
cers in the world carries its own touch of irony.
IV. PiEWvious REFORM ATTEMPTS
If there is anything in the old adage that the criminal is irresistibly
drawn back to the scene of his crime, then the previous abortive attempts
at reform can be considered as at least important admissions of weakness
or infirmity, whatever else they were not. In fact this is probably the most
significant thing about them. There has been, it is clear, a very real and
manifest concern for some years on the part of responsible citizens as to the
defects in the state judicial organization. Of this the legislature has be-
come so aware that, in addition to the Judicial Council, it has created a
series of committees or commissions to give special study either to the
general problem or to some particular aspect of it. Scarcely a year of
recent times has passed when some official body is not earnestly grappling
with the problem. It is a matter of melancholy interest to realize how so
79. The size of the amount in Hartford is to be e-plained, in part, by the fact that the
Hartford judge has established a retirement and pension system for his clerks and em-
ployees. Expenses in New Haven will probably increase as a result of new policies adopted
by the judge in that district.
80. The pattern of net income in 1948 was as follows:
$10,000 and over 13 districts
5,000 to 10,000 16 districts
3,000 to 5,000 16 districts
2,000 to 3,000 7 districts
1,000 to 2,000 22 districts
500 to 1,000 26 districts
under 500 19 districts
81. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6833 (1949).
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much devoted effort of so many people has produced so little beneficial
results, not to speak of some positive losses. The moral seems quite clear.
Such minor tinkering is of so little value that the demand for improvement
is hardly stilled for a moment and is soon vigorously renewed. Halfway
palliatives are worse than none at all.
The bodies active in judicial reform include first, the Judicial Council,12
a steady and patient worker since its creation in 1927, and second, the three
legislative commissions set up since 1938 for study of the courts or various
aspects of them. 3 A survey indicates that only two improvements can be
attributed to these attempts at reform. First, as a result of the persistent
efforts of the Judicial Council dating from its initial report in 1928, a
change in the selection of the minor court judges from the General Assem-
bly to nomination by the Governor with Assembly confirmation was
achieved with the adoption of a constitutional amendment to that effect in
1948.4 Second, following the recommendation in 1939 of the Committee
to Study the Minor Court Systems, 5 the "trial justice" system was adopted
as a substitute for indiscriminate trial of criminal cases by any elected
justice of the peace.8 "
In an over-all appraisal of these reform movements it must be said that
these two limited improvements are not sufficiently substantial to offset the
disappointing, not to say detrimental, results of the activities of the two
most recent Commissions. At no time in the past was there such an auspi-
cious opportunity to achieve substantial reform as in 1943, when the legis-
lature authorized the creation of the Commission to Study Integration of
the State Judicial System.s7 The operative section of the enabling statute
directed the Commission to "study the integration and reorganization of
the judicial system of the state," including all the courts, "to determine the
most efficient and economical methods of integrating and reorganizing the
same into one judicial system.""8 In spite of this broad directive, and over
the stated objections of its chairman, Associate Justice Newell Jennings, a
majority of the Commission came to the conclusion not to recommend a
complete integration of the Connecticut judicial system. It was felt that
such a plan would meet with favor neither in the legislature nor with the
82. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7659 (1949).
83. These commissions, listed in the order in which they were created, are: The Com-
mittee to Study the Minor Court System, Report of the Legislative Council vii (1938);
The Commission to Study the Integration of the State Judicial System, Conn. Special
Act 218, 1943; and The Commission to Study the Probate Court System, Conn. Special
Act 217, 1945.
84. CONN. Co ST. Ai ND. XLVII (1948). See note 48 mtpra.
85. Report of Committee to Study the Minor Court Systemn, JOURNAL OF TIE HOUSE
195 et seq. (1939).
86. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 7566 et seq. (1949). See p. 1408 supra.
87. Conn. Special Act 218, 1943.
88. § 4, Conn. Special Act 218, 1943.
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people of the state, that "each subdivision of the judicial system has grown
up more or less independently," and that "the character of Connecticut
people tends rather to an individualistic point of view than to centralization
and integration."'  After this summary disposition of important argu-
ments, all hope of a thoroughgoing reorganization of the judiciary, as con-
templated in the statute which created the Commission, was lost.
The 1943 Commission failed to satisfy the public demand for reform
because it refused to make any substantial recommendations. The 1945
Commission to Study the Probate Court System failed because it did make
recommendations-recommendations which, under the guise of reform,
have made a bad situation even more intolerable. This latter Commission
was appointed because its predecessor was unable to agree on any over-all
plan for the improvement of the probate courts. 0 No such indecision
marked the deliberations of this body. It decided forthrightly, taking its
cue and quoting from the statement to it of the powerful Probate Assembly,
that the probate system had given general satisfaction and met with general
approval of the people.9 ' As to reform, the Commission again quoted the
Assembly to the effect that any attempt to streamline these courts or to set
up the Massachusetts or New York systems "will meet violent, determined
and insurmountable opposition."92
With such premises it was natural that the Commission should make no
recommendations for organizational changes in the probate system. It
was, however, concerned, as had been the earlier commission, by the public
criticism of the excessive remuneration received by some of the probate
judges. It hit upon an ingenious solution, namely the recapture of net
earnings in accordance with a graduated scale. 3 The funds so obtained
would be used to meet the expenses of a standing probate commission, com-
posed of four members of the Probate Assembly and three citizens ap-
pointed by the Governor, to study the probate administration of the state,
and, inter alia, to prepare "a simple, clear and concise schedule of probate
fees." Any surplus was to be allotted back to the probate districts in pro-
portion to the gross income received.94
In 1947 the legislature adopted this recommendation with some changes
of detail and one of important substance." That was to substitute the
already powerful Probate Assembly itself in place of a separate probate
commission as both the custodian and beneficiary of the Probate Fund.
89. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE INTEGRATION OF THE STATE JU-
DICIAL SYSTEM 4 (1944). Justice Jennings' statement appears at id. 18.
90. Id. at 10.
91. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE PROBATE COURT SYSTEM 3 (Ingals
Printing Co., Danielson, Conn., 1947).
92. Ibid.
93. Id. at 13.
94. Ibid.
95. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 6831-6836 (1949).
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By this statute the legislature approved and financed a group which for
fifty years has represented the private interests of the probate judges. In
effect reform of the probate system was entrusted to that group of persons
which has the most interest to oppose any substantial change and which
has shown itself alert and powerful to do so. It is another bit of irony that
all the serious movements for probate reform should have led to this firmer
entrenchment of an outworn system in the fundamental law of our state.
This recital of the sorry history of Connecticut judicial reform does not
mean that the efforts of all the persons who served on these various bodies
have been entirely wasted. On the contrary, many of the opinions put
forward either as minority reports or as recommendations which the legis-
lature rejected were noteworthy contributions to the cause of reform. In-
deed, some of the recommendations suggested herein are but developments
of these earlier ideas. For instance, the Judicial Council in its 1932, 1934,
1936, and 1938 reports urged that a District Court be created to supplant
all the courts below the Superior Court, leaving only three courts, the Su-
preme Court, the Superior Court, and the District Court, all state courts.
The Committee to Study the Minor Court System recommended that the
Court of Common Pleas be organized into two divisions, an appellate divi-
sion and a circuit divisionY The former was a continuation of the existing
court; the latter was a substitute for all the minor courts except the justices
of the peace, or, in effect, a district court organization within the common
pleas framework. The views of several of the members of the 1943 Com-
mission disclosed possibilities for future consideration. Thus, Chairman
Jennings urged study of the Minnesota plan for the integration of the courts
of that state, pointing out that the plan seemed adaptable to conditions
here." Two distinguished lawyer members offered plans for the reorgani-
zation of the probate courts, cutting down sharply on the number of dis-
tricts and staffing the courts with salaried judges." Indeed a substantial
majority of the Commission recommended that the probate courts be made
96. For the details of the Judicial Council's District Court Plan see FIFTH RE1. CONN.
JUD. COUNCIL (1936).
97. Report of the Committee to Study the Minor Court System, JOURNAL OF Ti1B
HOUSE 198 et seq. (1939).
98. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY THE INTEGRATION OF TE STATE JU-
DICIAL SYSTEM 18 (1944); see also Jennings, The Commission to Study the Integration of
the Judicial System, 17 CONN. B.J. 212 (1943). It may be noted that shortly before this
Commission was organized, its vice-chairman, Judge Kenneth Wynne, had advocated ab-
sorption of the Court of Common Pleas by the Superior Court. Wynne, Court Reforin in
Connecticut, 16 CONN. B.J. 179 (1942).
99. See the article by Mr. Warren F. Cressy, Proceedings and Report of the Judicial
Study Commission As It Affects Probate Courts, 18 CONN. B.J. 160 (1944), which sets
forth, inter alia, the views of himself and of Mr. Hugh Meade Alcorn, Jr., as indicated in
the text.
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state courts and that all the judges be placed on a salary fixed by the leg-
islature and paid by the state."' 0
Beyond the significance of these individual opinions is of course the
powerful argument thus given by these successive failures for a more forth-
right attack upon the problem.
V. THE RECOMMENDED SOLUTION-DETAIL FOR AN
INTEGRATED COURT
It seemed therefore to the Survey Unit that, in the light of the general
experience, the chaotic conditions in the lower Connecticut courts and the
various abortive attempts at reform both pointed directly toward a single
definite solution of the problem: the unification of all the courts in one
system directed and controlled and generally supported as an instrumen-
tality of the state itself. While the details of this may vary, the trend and
purpose are clear. Specifically there would be one judicial department
under the administrative direction of the Chief Justice and such staff as
may be necessary for control and allocation of personnel, fiscal and financial
payments and accounting, and the collection of statistics of court business
and operation (now so sadly lacking as to all the minor courts). The
Division for the trial of cases of general jurisdiction would be limited to
the Superior Court, which would absorb the present trial jurisdiction of the
Court of Common Pleas. The Division for the trial of cases now heard by
the municipal and justice courts would be that of the Common Pleas Court
of sufficient territorial extent and judicial power to command the services
and justify the salaries of competent judges. The probate Division should
follow a similar course, with, quite obviously, abandonment of the notori-
ous fee system of support of the judges. Special divisions, such as that for
the Juvenile Court, could be incorporated into or added to the department
as policy demands.
Details of a proposed system embodying these general specifications
follow.
Administrative Direction of the System
Under the general plan, each link in the state court system would be
definitely geared into the Judicial Department as a part of a particular divi-
sion of that department. While the Chief Justice would act as administra-
tive director of the entire organization, he would not himself need to engage
in the details of operation of each division. Thus each division would have
its own chief judge, and all of these would sit with the Chief Justice as the
Department's executive committee. This committee, in turn, would be
assisted by an administrative office-perhaps the present office of the Ex-
ecutive Secretary expanded so as to become the actual directing head of
100. 'REPORT OF THE COM3MISSION TO STUDY THE INTEGRATION OF THE STATE Ju-
DICIAL SYSTEM 10, 11 (1944).
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the courts, as well as its fiscal, financial, and accounting agency. This
office would maintain current statistics and be able at all times to advise the
Committee of any organizational or operational changes needed to secure
the smooth functioning of the system and the fullest use of judicial per-
sonnel. Upon its recommendations the Chief Judges of the several divi-
sions would assign judges within their divisions as the pressure of business
required. The Chief Justice would necessarily be responsible for the as-
signment of judges between divisions.
The Supreme Court Division
The Supreme Court would function much as at present. Since, as here-
inafter pointed out, the present system of many trials de novo in the various
courts would be eliminated, it is possible, although not necessarily probable,
that the number of direct appeals to the Supreme Court would be increased.
Were the burden to become too great, it would not then be difficult to or-
ganize an intermediate appellate division of the Superior Court, in analogy
to the system in operation in many states, including New York and New
Jersey.
The Superior Court Division
Basically the Superior Court would remain unchanged except that its
jurisdiction would be expanded to include all the trial jurisdiction now in
the overlapping Court of Common Pleas. To offset this increase in burden
the intermediate appellate jurisdiction of the present Superior Court would
be removed and its divorce jurisdiction transferred to the Juvenile Court
as expanded into a family court. The over-all increase in business remain-
ing should not be greater than can be handled by probably not more than
five additional judges.
The Common Pleas Division
This Division, utilizing the facilities and to some extent the personnel of
the present Court of Common Pleas, would be assigned the criminal and
civil jurisdiction now exercised by the town, city and borough courts and
the trial justice courts. This new court would then have criminal juris-
diction over petty offenses and also sit to determine probable cause for bind-
ing over those accused of felonies for trial in the Superior Court. It would
have exclusive civil jurisdiction of both legal and equitable claims up to
$1,000 in amount.
The court should operate on a state-wide basis; and its judges should be
appointed as state officers, although it would desirably hold sessions in
more local areas than do the present high courts. It should have as many
judges as are required for the efficient performance of its activities. It is
thought that on the present basis of business a total of thirty judges should
[Vol. 59:1I3951418
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be adequate, with activities normally distributed as follows: eight sitting
in New Haven County, including Waterbury; six in Hartford County;
five in Fairfield County; three in New London County; two in Litchfield,
Middlesex, and Windlham counties; one in Tolland County; and the chief
judge at large and sitting wherever needed. While the judges would be
appointed from the state as a whole and be eligible to be assigned to any
part of the state, it would probably be generally more convenient that they
be assigned to certain counties and go on circuit for the most part only in
the counties to which they are assigned. Thus in New Haven County
court would be held continuously in the large cities, and occasionally, say
once or twice a week, in other convenient locations. The type of cases to be
heard makes it desirable that there be had at least this much localization of
minor criminal cases, preliminary hearings for the determination of prob-
able cause in more serious criminal offenses, the disposition of small claims,
the trial of the small civil cases, and, as later pointed out, the probate hear-
ings. Details of these assignments would, however, be in the control of the
Administrative Office.
The time-consuming and expensive system of allowing appeals to some
higher tribunal, with a complete trial de novo from these courts, should be
eliminated. A substantial reason for these retrials-beyond an implication
that the courts of first instance are not adequate to dispose finally of these
causes where litigants object-seems to be the preservation of the right of
jury trial in both civil and criminal matters. Provision therefore should
be made for holding both civil and criminal jury sessions of the courts of
common pleas as those may be needed. Such sessions may well be limited
in time and place-as to the larger centers and at only certain periods of
the judicial term-since under the system of jury waiver the jury calendar
may be reasonably expected to be short.
In the Survey Report there was also set forth a possible form of organiza-
tion of a district court system along territorial lines for combined minor
court and probate jurisdiction accompanied by a statement of the reasons
why the state-wide organization above outlined was preferable. Since the
problems of setting proper territorial limits to a district and of making
judicial work and compensation at all uniform are so obviously insuperable,
we do not take the space here to repeat those reasons as advanced in the
Report.
The Probate Division
This Division should be a state system of courts, in place of the present
local and fee-supported tribunals. Its organization would correspond to
that just stated for the Court of Common Pleas. It is believed that twenty
judges would be adequate, sitting more or less as follows: five each in New
Haven and Hartford counties, four in Fairfield County, two in New Lon-
don County, and one each in the remaining counties. Although they would
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be state officers and subject to be assigned throughout the state as court
business required, normally the judges in the more populous counties would
go on circuit in their own counties only according to schedules and in places
wheretheir presence would be really needed. Presumably here the sittings
would be held in the larger places, but subject always to the control and
direction of the administrative officers of the department.
In order to make available to the public the more personal attention which
it has been urged would be lost by a change from our present system, it
would be desirable to have a sufficient number of clerks and registrars sit-
ting in various places in each county to be generally available to the public.
Nevertheless it is not thought necessary that there be such an office in every
town or in each of the present probate districts. Location of such offices
in the larger cities and in a combination of the smaller towns would seem
sufficient. This would provide for adequate keeping of the records, a most
important function of the new arrangement. The statutes should provide,
however, for the greater disposition by the clerks of uncontested matters
than now, for those are largely ministerial in nature; and the activities of
the judges should be reserved for contested matters or those involving a
large measure of discretion.
In keeping with the earlier suggestions as to avoiding duplicating trials,
some provision must be made to take care of the present appeals and trials
de novo in the Superior Court, with jury trials available on certain issues,
such as those of testamentary capacity or undue influence in the making of
wills. The same suggestion is made here as before, namely, that these
courts would now be of sufficient standing so that their trials should be
final, save for the usual appellate review of questions of law. This would
mean that on such issues as may be tried to a jury, a jury trial should be
made available in the probate Division, just as it is now, for example, in the
Surrogate's Court of New York. In practice, the probate jury calendar
would obviously be shorter than that for the common pleas; and limited
jury sessions could be more easily arranged by the Administrative Office.
The Family Court Division
The present Juvenile Court would become a division of the new Judicial
Department, retaining its present jurisdiction over juvenile delinquency
and having added to it jurisdiction over divorce and non-support problems
generally. To these, too, should be added bastardy complaints, now in the
jurisdiction of the various minor courts. This division would then be-
come a true family court. In order to handle this increase in business the
number of judges should be increased from 3 to 6.
Judicial Selection and Tenure
These organizational changes will give the judicial office sufficient dig-
nity and prestige to attract lawyers of high caliber to them. Conditions of
employment, primarily selection, salary, and tenure, should be raised to a
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level commensurate with the new importance of the office. Consequently
the recommendation of the Report was that either all the judges of the
state integrated court, from the highest to the supposed lowest, should be
appointed and serve under the same conditions, or, if any differentiation at
all was to be made, it should depend only upon experience and proved ca-
pacity and should be organized as a system of promotion, rather than of
distinction in rank or title. That is the necessity to bring the lower courts
to the level of public confidence; that, in the writers' judgment, is also the
practical method, and the only practical method, of achieving that desired
result.
This being the objective, the Survey Unit carefully refrained from press-
ing for changes in the selection or tenure of the high court judges. Since
these are universally respected, there seemed no reason to raise an issue
here, without any popular demand, particularly since extensive reform of
the entire lower court structure was so pressing a need. If, however, there
ever develops a demand for change with respect to these courts, then of
course selection of all the other judges of the single integrated court must
be changed in order that they be kept on the same plane for the reasons we
have stated. This is all that needs be said at this time as to judicial selec-
tion; we do venture to add two comments because of certain public discus-
sion stimulated by the Report.
The first is with reference to the so-called Missouri plan of selection
of judges sponsored by the American Bar Association.1 ' This in sub-
stance is the system by which the appointing officer selects a judge from a
panel built up by a more or less permanent body of judges and lawvyers cre-
ated for the purpose, and the judge so selected thereafter runs for the office
at a stated interval only against his own record and not against some other
candidate. It has obvious uses in a state ridden by political judges. While
the writers have no desire to go counter to any strong movement for such
a system here, we do suggest that no great need for it in this state has been
as yet disclosed. The record of our high court judges persuades strongly
otherwise; the all-too-brief experience with the minor courts under the new
system of choice does not prove the contrary, so clearly was this involved in
and controlled by their past history and immersion in politics. Moreover,
101. Mo. CONST. ART. 5, §§ 29(a)-29(g) (1945); THE ImPROVE!mErr OF THE Ainmu-
iSimRAON OF JusTicE, A HADBoox: PREPARED) BY THE SECrION OF JUDIcIAL AD=NlSrA-
TiON, A.B.A., 75-83 (1949); VANDERBILT, MINIMUMI STANDARDS OF JUDIcIAL ADUIN-
ISTRATioN 3-28 (1949). This proposal has been widely commented on. See articles cited
by VANDRBILT, loc. cit. supra; also extensive bibliography in HAYNES, SELE CTION AND
TEN RE OF JUDGES 238-303 (1944), covering all proposals. See also Lyman, 23 CoNN.
B.J. 355 (1949); Lashly, The Missouri Plan for Selection and Tenure of Judges, 21 CoNN.
B.J. 288 (1947). For views supporting the Connecticut system of appointment to the higher
courts, see the two articles by Chief Justice Maltbie, supra note 49; Robinson, ScIccion of
.Judges, 15 CONN. B.J. 291 (1941); Inglis, Tie Selection and Tenure of Judges, 22 CoNN.
B.J. 106 (1948); and compare Sinn, On Raising the Quality of Our Judges, 22 CoNu. B.J.
390 (1948).
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the recommended system must inevitably raise doubts at its central feature
of a selection directed and controlled by a select group of successful mem-
bers of the profession. It may be thought that judicial conservatism, at
various crucial times in American history, has been more productive of
doubt as to the court system than perhaps any other single thing, and
that this system, whatever its other advantages, does present serious ques-
tions in its natural tendency to solidify the normal conservative trends of
the bench.
The second is with reference to tenure. On this no more need be said
than as above, except that a-to us-wholly surprising misunderstanding
arose as to a recommendation of the Survey Unit charged with the duty
of studying the state constitution. It was not a part of the function of the
judiciary Survey Unit to study this problem; nor, in view of the limited
changes constitutionwise needed for the court reforms, was it anxious to
take on the extra burden of constitutional reform. Yet it did seem the part
of courtesy to respond to the request of those who made the constitutional
study for some expression of view as to the proposed judiciary article of
their draft of a constitution, as stated by them in an article recounting the
fate of their proposal."0 2 The chief problem arose as to the term of office
for the judges, for there were local precedents for eight, four, and two
years. None of these is theoretically appropriate; all are too short to in-
sure the independent tenure which is essential for the judicial function. It
is true, however, that by strong tradition the eight-year term has really been
translated into life tenure until the retiring age of seventy; and it is that tra-
dition we need to utilize to safeguard also the minor courts. But since that
step had never been taken for these courts, since the latest expression of the
legislative and popular view was in the widely supported constitutional
amendment giving the Governor the right to nominate the minor judges
for appointment by the General Assembly "for such term and in such man-
ner as shall be by law prescribed,"' 1 3 it was thought that this should be the
constitutional provision which would most quickly and directly allow for
the raising of standards of tenure to keep pace with the hoped-for develop-
ing tradition. That such a provision, with such a background, could have
been construed, as it was in some quarters, as an attack on the independence
of the judiciary has left us completely mystified. There seemed an upside-
down character to the contention thus advanced against a serious move-
ment to raise the standards of the minor judges, not to lower those of the
high judges. It is perhaps a further tribute to our judiciary that so many
could have rushed so hastily to the defense of the judges without taking the
pains to see if they were really under attack.104 But we could wish that the
102. Braden & Cahill, A New Constitution for Connecticut, 24 CoNN. B.J. 121, 167
(1950).
103. CONN. CONST. AMEND. XLVII (1948). See notes 48, 84 supra.
104. Even had there been a concealed and sinister purpose behind all this, it is difficult
to see how practically it could be effectuated or the threat made real. Conceivably three
[Vol. 59: 13951422
HeinOnline -- 59 Yale L. J. 1422 1949-1950
COURT INTEGRATION-A CASE STUDY
matter had been viewed more dispassionately, since there is a problem how
best to translate the Connecticut tradition into formal conventional lan-
guage and that problem has not even been considered in the heightened at-
mosphere which the suggestion seemed to engender. In view of this con-
tretemps the best which can be suggested at the moment appears to be that
the terms of all judges of the proposed integrated court should be at least
eight years, and preferably longer.
VI. THE Low COST OF EFFICIENT JUSTICE
It must be obvious to ill that the lower courts are, for natural reasons,
the revenue-producing elements of our judicial system. The fines for the
petty criminal offenses, particularly for traffic violations, run into immense
sums each year, even excluding that newly-found gold mine for hard-
pressed cities, the revenue from parking meters.10 No such comparable
revenue can be expected from the class of crimes in the particular control of
the high courts. As for the revenue from the probate courts, that is tradi-
tionally a lawyer's dream. To date this revenue has been dissipated among
the cities and towns and the officials themselves. Collected entirely by the
state, it would furnish revenue sufficient to operate an exceedingly high-
grade system of state courts.
courses to effect it might be thought of. Of these the power of impeachment-available
for the removal of judges, CONN. CONST. ART. 5, § 3, ART. 9, § 3 (1818); AUE.ND. XII
(1856)-is so well known and so hedged about with safeguards as hardly to constitute a
threat to the judiciary. The further provision, ART. 5, § 3, that "the Governour shall also re-
move them [the Supreme and Superior Court judges] on the address of two thirds of the
members of each house of the General Assembly," repeated in AmEnn. XII, has not proved
a threat in the past, and, in view of the standard political divisions of the State, is hardly
likely to do so in the future. But if, as believed, the provision is already practically obsolete,
it might be well to have it removed completely, particularly for the assurance of those 'who
think a Rhode Island incident, Recent Legislative Election of Supremne Court Justices in
Rlwde Island, 21 A.B.A.J. 306 (1935), might conceivably be repeated here, even though the
governing provision of the Rhode Island Constitution is wholly unlike that of Connecticut.
The third possibility, sudden abolition of or change in judicial terms, seems not only politi-
cally impossible, but also unworkable, even if attempted, since existing judicial terms are
not for uniform time periods, but only from the occurring of vacancies caused by death or
retirement of sitting judges. Legislation directed against a particular judge before his term
expired could have no more standing under the proposed constitution than it would have
now. See acute demonstration of the insubstantiality of these fears by Messrs. Braden &
Cahill, supra note 102.
105. Receipts from fines in criminal cases and costs in civil cases (the latter a relatively
small item) in the municipal courts were $554,307.09 in 1939-40, $561,650.79 in 1940-41, and
$726,382.57 in 1941-42, the last year for which statistics are available. Included therein for
"parking violations" were 0.00 in 1939-40, $23,968.50 for 1940-41, and "1,749.75 for 1941-
42. Total receipts for the justice courts were $62,842.66 for 1939-40, $56,069.49 for 1940-
41, and $88,721.33 for 1941-42. Because of the failure of some courts to report and the
restricted use of automobiles at that time, these figures are undoubtedly understated. Even
if returns from parking violations are deducted, the amounts must have substantially in-
creased over the ten-year period, having in mind the increase in population and the disturb-
ing growth of automobile traffic. An estimate of a total of one million dollars for 1951-52
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In advance of a definite program established by the legislature, perhaps
no more than this should be said. There has been no tradition in this state
of niggardliness in the administration of justice and there is no reason to
suppose that there is any wide support for viewing effective justice strictly
from the financial end. But in response to a demand for illustration of the
substantial savings envisaged, the Survey Unit set up a tentative budget
purely for illustrative purposes. We repeat it here, also repeating the same
warnings. It is only for the purposes of illustration; it is designed not to
prove that justice should be cheap, but only that the large sums now coin-
ing from our people for court support can be used to better advantage. As
will be seen, we have provided large leeway in various important items to
provide for unexpected charges. There must, of course, be a period of
trial and error; the advantage of the administrative unification of the court
system is that the administrative office can ascertain the results of experi-
ence and recommend the changes which may be needed.
A Budget Estimate
With these caveats we turn to the suggested budget. Relying on the
most recent figures available, it seemed that a moderate and modest esti-
mate would set the figure of two million dollars, one each from the probate
and from the other minor courts, as the potential court receipts by 1951 or
1952."06 The cost of the present court of common pleas was $374,947.86
for 1948-49; it is due for a substantial increase for later years because of
an increase in salaries. This will be saved; but against it should be charged
roughly about $100,000 for additional superior and family court judges as
recommended. There should therefore be no new drain upon state finances
until and unless the cost of the new court structure exceeds two and a quar-
ter or two and a half million dollars.
The proposed budget for the new divisions of the integrated court as set
forth in the Report was as follows:
Salaries of judges ........................... $625,000
of clerks and assistant clerks of common pleas.. 175,000
of clerks, assistant clerks, and registrars of pro-
bate .................................. 225,000
of assistant prosecutors ................... 200,000
Supplies .................................. 75,000
Other expenses ............................ 200,000
$1,500,000
is therefore very moderate. Statistics obtained from the office of the Executive Secretary
of the Judicial Department.
106. Gross receipts by probate judges for 1948 were $813,007.07. This is a constantly
increasing figure, representing a gain of some $175,000 over the previous six-year coverage;
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These are believed to be reasonably generous estimates, providing for 50
judges, some 8 or 9 clerks, and 24 assistant clerks in the common pleas
Division, a like number, plus 30 registrars, for the probate Division, some
50 assistant prosecutors, and 80 to 100 clerical and other assistants of vari-
ous kinds and grades, with a large allowance for supplies. But whether
these individual items are generous or not, it should be noticed that on the
basis of the receipts as estimated there would still remain unexpended up-
ward of $500,000 of expected court revenue and of $300,000 of savings
from the abolition of the present common pleas setup. These v.arious mar-
gins seem so generous as to avoid any real chance of substantial underesti-
mate.
Criticism and Rcsponse
Some speakers at the legislative hearing were disposed to attack these
figures; but the suggestions made, in our judgment, tend on the whole to
show their soundness. It was pointed out that the state would assume re-
sponsibility for a personnel which hitherto had been no part of its burden
as a governmental unit, and that the estimate took no note of retiring al-
lowances either for judges or for court personnel. Both these points are of
course obvious and not to be denied. As to the latter, it is not the program
of the state to set up retiring reserves. Hence initially there would be no
increase in the estimates for these purposes; what the costs might amount
to twenty or fifty years hence would be difficult to guess uniquely for this
one department alone; but the margin between expected receipts and ex-
penditures should be adequate. As to the former, of course the state will
assume the responsibility which hitherto has been diffused and rendered
meaningless among many towns, cities, and individuals. That, indeed, is
the keystone of the reform. It is not to be doubted that some towns will
profit by the change, by transferring a burden to the state; while others, sit-
uated on through highways, will lose some profitable revenue from traffic
offenses. (It is not proposed to take for the state any of the rich revenue
from parking meters.) And some probate officials may lose high profits
while the system is made uniform as to all. But all this revenue comes
eventually from the people of the state; it is fitting and proper that it should
be used to maintain state courts worthy of the dignity of the state. Our
demonstration is directed to the point that this can and should be done
without increase of financial burden on the state or on its citizens. This
seeming miracle can be accomplished by ordinary businesslike methods pro-
viding for one closely knit state organization with co-operating units in
place of the hundreds of diverse and conflicting political organisms now
fighting to occupy the field.
it should be one million dollars by 1951 or 1952. For an analysis of receipts from the minor
courts see note 105 supra.
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VII. MECHANICS OF ACHIEVING THE REFORM
Except in one particular, all the changes recommended above are within
the constitutional power of the legislature.1"7 The selection of probate
judges by popular election is embedded in the Constitution." 8 That should
be changed by constitutional amendment. Otherwise a comprehensive
statute defining the integrated Judicial Department as here visualized is
alone necessary.
It is, of course, true that a neater job of tying loose ends, consolidating
constitutional amendments, and stating straightforwardly in one place all
the provisions concerning the judiciary would have its advantages. For
example, the justice of the peace is already an outworn official, save for the
designated trial justice in each town having no municipal court. It would
be better to abolish this office altogether than to retain the formal remnants
as at present. But the perils of remaking the Constitution seem many. We
have already referred to the tempest-in-a-teapot set forth by an innocent
provision taken from the existing Constitution itself.100 Perhaps it may
be the part of wisdom to limit the constitutional changes to a minimum.
If so, that minimum is as stated.
VIII. THE FUTURE OF THE PROPOSAL
As has been stated, the special session of the legislature, sitting in the
spring of 1950, took no action whatsoever with respect to these proposals.
But that was not wholly unexpected and certainly is not to be construed as
their definite rejection. At this writing there seem definite grounds for
hope that the bar and bench of the state will give serious study and consider-
ation to the problem. Clearly it requires the attention of the best minds of
the profession; and no one scheme should be put forward as definitive and
final.
The most significant development is in connection with the State Bar
Ass6ciation. The high command of that organization, its sixteen-member
Council, appeared to be taken somewhat by surprise; its first reaction was
the lawyerlike plea for more time. So on February 20, 1950, the Council
voted, and the president requested of the Governor and legislative leaders,
that legislative action on the proposed court reorganization be postponed
for at least one year. The Council's reasons for this request were that the
recommendations were of such magnitude as to require "extended study
and debate" before enactment."0 But at the same time the organization
showed an open-minded attitude toward the proposal by taking steps for
107. CONN. CONST. ART. 5, "Of the Judicial Department," providing, inter alia, for
"such inferiour courts as the General Assembly shall, from time to time, ordain and estab-
lish."
108. CONN. CONST. AMEND. IX (1850), AMEND. XXI (1876), AmND. XLIV (1948).
109. See notes 102-104 supra.
110. N.H. Evening Register, Feb. 21, 1950, p. 1, col. 2.
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its careful consideration. For it arranged for the creation of a committee,
composed of distinguished lawyers and judges, to give independent study
and consideration to the proposed reforms."' The chairman of the Com-
mission at once replied to the president of the Association to point out that
the Association's request and plan for study by a committee coincided with
the Commission's schedule and plans for future action. It was the Com-
mission's plan that the recommended legislation which was to be presented
to the General Assembly on Mardi 9 would not include detailed specific
plans for changes in the existing court system, but only a basic framework
upon which a second commission could build. Ample opportunity would
be given to both the bench and the bar for their participation in the prepa-
ration of this second-stage legislation.1 2 Accordingly, the committee set
to work to study the proposal, and a report should be forthcoming shortly
-probably before this article appears in print.
Interest in the Report has undoubtedly been stimulated by the political
developments with respect to it. This is an election year for state officials,
of more than usual importance, because for the fiist time the Governor will
be elected for a four-year term, instead of the previous two-year tenure.
The Republicans in their program for the campaign pledged advance accept-
ance of the Bar committee's recommendations as "the basis" for court
reform, and the Republican candidate for the governorship has reiterated
this position in response to a questionnaire of the League of Women
Voters." 3  The Democratic Party is already committed to court reform
along the general lines of these proposals, first by action of the Democratic
leaders in the General Assembly and then by their party platform for the
fall campaign." 4 On the basis of the campaign promises, therefore, it
would seem that some reform is due; the Bar committee members may well
be the key figures in determining whether it is to be responsive to the needs
and not merely another in the recurring weak attempts which have failed
to satisfy the public for improvement.
111. The membership of this committee consists of Supreme Court Justice Inglis as
Chairman, Justice O'Sullivan, Dean Sturges of the Yale Law School, Mr. Samuel A.
Persky, a former President of the New Haven County Bar Association, and Messrs.
Charles M. Lyman and Charles W. PettengilU, both former Presidents of the State Bar
Association.
112. The text of Mr. Atkins' letter is given in N.H. Evening Register, Feb. 24, 1950,
p. 1, col. 3.
113. The Republican Party Platform is stated in N.H. Evening Register, June 12, 1950,
p. 1, cols. 2, 3; the statement of Representative Lodge, the Republican candidate for Gover-
nor, appears in N.H. Evening Register, Sept. 15, 1950, p. 1, col. 6. See also, A PosrrivE
PROGRAM BY CONNECrICUT REpuBIucANS, THE REPuncAN PoLcY Co~mmrrma20 (1950);
and 11 The Connecticut Voter No. 2 (1950).
114. For a statement of the Democratic Platform see N.H. Evening Register, July 25,
1950, p. 19, coL 1; for the position of Governor Bowles, the Democratic candidate for re-
election, see, in addition to his messages to the special session of the legislature, the pam-
phlet cited in note 25 supra.
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In addition to this main study project, local bar committees have been
constituted with like purpose, although in all probability they may await
the report of the state group. There seems to be substantial interest in the
subject, distinguished for quality, if perhaps not for quantity. The day-
long hearing on these proposals before the joint committees of the House
and Senate on April 20, 1950--said to be one of the most thorough of the
two-month session-demonstrated as much. There the widespread charac-
ter of the demand for some kind of reform was again made manifest. Dis-
tinguished lawyers and judges, as well as representatives of semiofficial
groups, appeared and showed their concern while giving at least qualified
support to the particular reform proposed."" The Administrative Director
of the New Jersey Courts was good enough to appear and to explain the
benefits of integration as seen in New Jersey."" In the long session there
were only four heard definitely in opposition-all representatives of the
Connecticut Probate Assembly." 7 For a land of "steady habits" not prone
to change the showing was impressive.
The history of judicial reform has not been one of a people's rising; it
is too much to expect that the populace generally can follow and appraise
the defects of a highly specialized system such as the law and its courts.
Instead improvement will come, as it has in the federal courts and in the
courts of other states, from the informed leadership of the judges and
lawyers who are most intimately concerned with the successful operation
of the system."" The responsibility of the local bar in this matter is made
particularly acute by the announcement by the Republican Party of its sup-
port of the Bar Association's findings, whatever they may be. The rest
would seem to be in the hands first of the distinguished committee and sec-
ond of the rank and file of the bar. This is, after all, quite as it should be.
Court reform, to be intelligent, sophisticated, and lasting, must be the prod-
uct of the best effort of our profession. That is a truth which has become
115. These included former Chief Justice William M. Maltbie, Associate Justice Newel
Jennings, Judge William S. Gordon, the Judicial Council, and the State Bar Association,
as well as Judge James A. Shanley of the important New Haven Probate Court. N.H.
Evening Register, Apr. 21, 1950, p. 1, col. 1.
116. Mr. Willard G. Woelper, whose yearly reports as Administrative Director of the
New Jersey Courts are already setting a standard for other courts to follow. They follow
the path blazed by the Annual Reports of the Administrative Director of the United States
Courts. See Shafroth, Federal Judicial Statistics, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROD. 200 (1948);
Report of Committee on Judicial Statistics, 7 FED. B.J. 292 (1946). See note 21 supra.
117. N.H. Evening Register, Apr. 21, 1950, p. 1, col. 1.
118. A notable example of leadership bringing reform to the courts of a state is Chief
Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt's success in New Jersey. See Harrison, Judicial Reform in
New Jersey, 22 STATE GOVERNMENT 232 (1949); Clark, Code Pleading and Practice
Today, in DAvID DuDLEY FiEU CENTENARY EssAYs 55, 70-72 (1949); Clark & Wright,
The Judicial Council and the Ride-Making Power: A Dissent and A Protest, 1 SYRACUSn
L. REv. 346, 348-351 (1950); Sunderland, The English Struggle for Procedural Refor,
39 HARV. L. REv. 725 (1926).
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increasingly apparent to the bar associations of the country, whose interest
in the unified court was noted at the beginning of this article. Yet acknowl-
edgment of this responsibility must become even more widespread and
response to it still more active if the quite stupendous job of bringing the
American courts to the proper level of organizational efficiency is to be suc-
cessfully completed. Hence the Connecticut challenge has more than local
implications. If the local bar can and does rise to the opportunity, then,
indeed, we shall have here a case study, worthy of emulation, in the initia-
tion of judicial reform." 9
119. After this article was prepared, the Bar committee filed its report accepting and
recommending active support for all the proposals of the Commission except those con-
cerning the probate courts. As to the latter a majority accepted the substance of the Com-
mission proposals (without so conceding), but recommended a plan whereby contested
probate matters should be tried by superior court judges instead of by a probate Division
as recommended by the Commission. The minority (Messrs. Inglis and Pettengill)
would retain the "father-confessor" attributes of the present probate judges, while advo-
cating the cutting down of the number of probate districts and of excessive receipts of
fees. At its meeting October 17, 1950, the State Bar Association voted approval of the
Report and support of its recommendations, except as to probate matters; as to these,
it voted for a referendum by mail of its members. While this hesitancy as to the system of
quite partial justice exemplified in the probate courts shows again their deep local roots,
yet the unanimity of support for the other comprehensive and far-reaching reforms augurs
well for future court improvement.
The report will be discussed by the present authors in an article, A Proposal for Court
Reform in Connecticut, scheduled to appear in the CoNxEcricuT BArt J U -AL for De-
cember, 1950.
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